IN December, the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity made an unprecedented request: it asked the editors of the journals Nature and Science not to publish certain details in two papers describing experiments in which scientists created a highly transmissible form of the deadly H5N1 influenza virus in ferrets. The board’s primary concern was that terrorists might use the data to weaponize influenza.
In the weeks since, supporters of the board’s decision have issued warnings against publishing these papers in their entirety — and some have even called for destroying the new form of the virus. To calm matters, the scientific teams conducting the work agreed to a 60-day moratorium on their research. Starting Feb. 16, the World Health Organization will hold an international meeting to discuss how best to proceed.
Such caution, though well intentioned, is misplaced. The censorship of influenza research will do little to prevent its misuse by evildoers — and it may well hinder our ability to stop influenza outbreaks, whether natural or
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